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Chapter 11 
Cognitive Interdependence in Close Relationships 
Daniel M Wegner, Toni Giuliano, and Paula T. Hertel 
This chapter is concerned with the thinking processes of the intimate dyad. So, 
although we will focus from time to time on the thinking processes of the 
individual-as they influence and are influenced by the relationship with 
another person-our prime interest is in thinking as it occurs at the dyadic level. 
This may be dangerous territory for inquiry. After all, this topic resembles one 
that has, for many years now, represented something of a "black hole" in the 
social sciences-the study of the group mind. For good reasons, the early 
practice of drawing an analogy between the mind of the individual and the 
cognitive operations of the group has long been avoided, and references to the 
group mind in contemporary literature have dwindled to a smattering of 
wisecracks. 
Why, then, would we want to examine cognitive interdependence in close 
relationships? Quite simply, we believe that much could be learned about 
intimacy in this enterprise, and that a treatment of this topic, enlightened by the 
errors of past analyses, is now possible. The debate on the group mind has 
receded into history sufficiently that its major points can be appreciated, and at 
the same time, we find new realms of theoretical sophistication in psychology 
regarding the operation of the individual mind. With this background, we 
believe it is possible to frame a notion somewhat akin to the "group mind" -and 
to use it to conceptualize how people in close relationships may depend on each 
other for acquiring, remembering, and generating knowledge. 
I 
Interdependent Cognition 
Interdependence is the hallmark of intimacy. Although we are all inter­
dependent to a certain degree, people in close relationships lead lives that are 
intertwined to the extreme. Certainly, the behaviors they enact, the emotions 
they feel, and the goals they pursue are woven in an intricate web (Davis, 1973; 
Kelley, Berscheid, Christensen, Harvey, Huston, Levinger, McClintock, 
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Peplau, & Peterson, 1983). But on hearing even the simplest conversation 
between intimates, it becomes remarkably apparent that their thoughts, too, are 
interconnected. Together, they think about things in ways they would not alone. 
The idea that is central in our analysis of such cognitive interdependence is what 
we term transactive memory. As will become evident, we find this concept 
more clearly definable and, ultimately, more useful than kindred concepts that 
populate the history of social psychology. As a preamble to our ideas on 
transactive memory, we discuss the group mind notion and its pitfalls. We then 
turn to a concern with the basic properties and processes of transactive 
memory. 
A Brief History of the Group Mind 
The analogy between the individual mind and the social system was extra­
ordinarily popular among 19th-century social theorists. Traceable in large part 
to the philosophies of Hegel (1807/1910) and Rousseau (1767), the tendency 
to draw this analogy gave rise to a variety of related ideas-the group mind, for 
one, but also notions of "collective consciousness," the" Volksgeist," "collec­
tive representations," the "mind of the crowd," and the "collective un­
conscious." Trading on the analogy was serious business at the time, and few 
eyebrows were raised when Herbert Spencer (1876) even went so far as to 
compare different brain structures to the different houses of the British 
Parliament. 
This line of theorizing was represented in various ways in subsequent writings 
in sociology (e.g., Durkheim, 191 5 ), psychology (e.g., W undt, 1910/ 1916 ), 
and psychoanalysis (e.g., Jung, 1922), and formed a major theoretical rallying 
point for the young science of social psychology (e.g., LeBon, 1903; 
McDougall, 1920; Ross, 1908). In each case, some variation on the "group 
mind" was used as a characterization of a property of the group. Principally, 
this idea was used to capture within-group similarity; a group contains 
individuals with similar attitudes, similar understandings of the world, shared 
language, and otherwise seemingly unitary outlooks. Also, the group mind could 
represent social agency; the group seemed to behave and think as a unit, an 
agent that could have dealings with other agents, reflect on itself, change its 
mind, and in many other ways resemble an individual. Finally, the group mind 
provided a way of appreciating the Gestalt or configural properties of groups; 
the group's actions might not be reducible to those of particular individuals, and 
the idea of the group mind offered theorists a repository for these emergent, 
irreducible events. 
The problem in all of this, it should come as no surprise, was that the group 
mind did not have a group body. Thus, there was the immediate question of 
where these properties of the group mind resided (see, e.g., Maciver, 1921). 
The more critical feature of this problem, however, was that the group mind had 
no voice. How would one ask the group mind a question? Would one ask the 
leader? In this case, the group mind is a useless concept, for its workings should 
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be entirely observable in the leader's reports. Would one take a vote? In this 
case, the group mind concept is again valueless, for it becomes less exact than 
the vote itself. Would one simply observe the group? This solution was 
suggested by Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932), who argued that to catch the group 
mind at work (at least as this mind was being conceptualized by theorists at the 
time), one would need to observe its voiceless embodiment-the group as a 
whole-and find the group doing something collectively that had not been 
suggested or preordained by any of its individual members. Obviously, at this 
point the idea of the group mind loses touch with reality. For the group mind's 
thought to be observed in this way, a group action specifically not associated 
with any observable means of communication would be necessary. 
Unfortunately, most of the proponents of the concept of a group mind 
eventually reached just this impasse. Many commentators, Bartlett included, 
pointed out that a group mind could be explained by the overlap of individual 
minds entering and leaving the group over time. The continuity and homo­
geneity of the group's outlook could merely be a matter of the continuous 
communication of group attitudes, knowledge, and customs to new members. 
This kind of explanation seemed entirely too common and uninteresting to 
group mind theorists, though, because it seemed to challenge the supposition 
that the group mind should be different from the minds of group members. 
Without this difference, of course, the group mind becomes but a superfluous 
addendum to the analysis of individual minds. So, in the pursuit of some unique, 
emergent quality of group mental life, theorists began turning to obscure 
avenues of explanation. Jung( 1922) and Pareto ( 1935) sought the origins of the 
group mind in genetics, a topic so little understood that it could be safely 
adduced, along with occasional references to the supernatural, as an explana­
tion of like-mindedness among group members. Even McDougall ( 1920) briefly 
entertained the hypothesis that telepathic communication fonned the foundation 
of group mental life. With magic as its last recourse, the group mind concept 
slipped ignominiously into the history of social psychology, and by its absence 
ordained the study of the individual as the prime focus of the field (cf. Allport, 
1968; Knowles, 1982). 
Is there anything in the idea worth preserving? Along with the early theorists, 
we believe that an emphasis on the difference between group and individual 
mental processes is an indispensable part of the definition of each. At the same 
time, we believe that the early theorists made two critical errors in defining the 
group mind that must be rectified for the furtherance of any similar idea. First, 
we propose that identifying the group mind with the similar mental processes 
and contents of group members is an error. As will be seen, we believe that such 
similarity may be both a cause and a consequence of group mental operations­
but it is not the defining quality of such operations themselves. Second, we 
suggest that sidestepping communication processes among group members in 
the analysis of group mental life is an error. We hope to show that such 
processes are the very center of group thought, and that far from cheapening or 
demystifying the unique properties of the group mind, these communication 
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processes operate to produce the distinction between the group mind and the 
minds of individual members. This said, it is still the case that the "group mind" 
terminology is steeped, perhaps forever, in error and opprobrium. Thus, we 
abandon such traditional language at this point, hoping to establish a more 
verifiable (and falsifiable) analysis by means of the idea of transactive 
memory. 
The Nature of Transactive Memory 
Ordinarily, psychologists think of memory as an individual's store of know­
ledge, along with the processes whereby that knowledge is constructed, 
organized, and accessed. So, it is fair to say that we are studying "memory" 
when we are concerned with how knowledge gets into the person's mind, how it 
is arranged in the context of other knowledge when it gets there, and how it is 
retrieved for later use. At this broad level of definition, our conception of 
transactive memory is not much different from the notion of individual memory. 
With transactive memory, we are concerned with how knowledge enters the 
dyad, is organized within it, and is made available for subsequent use by it. This 
analogical leap is a reasonable one as long as we restrict ourselves to 
considering the functional equivalence of individual and transactive memory. 
Both kinds of memory can be characterized as systems that, according to 
general system theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968), may show rough parallels in 
their modes of operation. Our interest is in processes that occur when the 
transactive memory system is called upon to perform some function for the 
group-a function that the individual memory system might reasonably be 
called upon to perform for the person. 
Transactive memory can be defined in terms of two components: (I) an 
organized store of knowledge that is contained entirely in the individual memory 
systems of the group members, and (2) a set of knowledge-relevant transactive 
processes that occur among group members. Stated more colloquially, we 
envision transactive memory to be a combination of individual minds and the 
communication among them. This definition recognizes explicitly that trans­
active memory must be understood as a name for the interplay of knowledge, 
and that this interplay, no matter how complex, is always capable of being 
analyzed in terms of communicative events that have individual sources and 
individual recipients. By this definition, then, the thought processes of 
transactive memory are completely observable. The various communications 
that pass between intimates are, in principle, observable by outside observers­
just as each intimate can observe the communications of the other. Using this 
line of interpretation, we recognize that the observable interaction between 
individuals entails not only the transfer of knowledge, but the construction of a 
knowledge-acquiring, knowledge-holding, and knowledge-using system that is 
greater than the sum of its individual member systems. 
Let us consider a simple example to bring these ideas down to earth. Suppose 
we are spending an evening with Rudy and Lulu, a couple married for several 
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years. Lulu is in another room for the moment, and we happen to ask Rudy 
where they got the wonderful stuffed Canadian goose on the mantle. He says, 
"We were in British Columbia .. . ," and then bellows, "Lulu! What was the 
name of that place where we got the goose?" Lulu returns to the room to say that 
it was near Kelowna or Penticton-somewhere along Lake Okanogan. Rudy 
says, "Yes, in that area with all the fruit stands." Lulu finally makes the 
identification: Peachland. In all of this, the various ideas that Rudy and Lulu 
exchange lead them through their individual memories. In a process of 
interactive cueing, they move sequentially toward the retrieval of a memory 
trace, the existence of which is known to both of them. And it is just possible 
that, without each other, neither Rudy nor Lulu could have produced the item. 
This is npt the only process of transactive memory. Although we will speak of 
interactive cueing again, it is just one of a variety of communication processes 
that operate on knowledge in the dyad. Transactive processes can occur during 
the intake of information by the dyad, they can occur after information is stored 
and so modify the stored information, and they can occur during retrieval. 
The successful operation of these processes is dependent, however, on the 
formation of a transactive memory structure-an organizational scheme that 
connects the knowledge held by each individual to the knowledge held by the 
other. It is common in theorizing about the thoughts and memories of 
individuals to posit an organizational scheme that allows the person to connect 
thoughts with one another-retrieving one when the other is encountered, and 
so forth. In a dyad, this scheme is complicated somewhat by the fact that the 
individual memory stores are physically separated. Yet it is perfectly reasonable 
to say that one partner may know, at least to a degree, what is in the other's 
memory. Thus, one's memory is "connected" to the other's, and it is possible to 
consider how information is arranged in the dyadic system as a whole. A 
transactive memory structure thus can be said to reside in the memories of both 
individuals-when they are considered as a combined system. 
We should point out here that transactive processes and structures are not 
exclusively the province of intimate dyads. We can envision these things 
occurring as well in pairs of people who have just met, or even in groups of 
people larger than the dyad. At the extreme, one might attribute these processes 
and organizational capacities to whole societies, and so make transactive 
memory into a synonym for culture. Our conceptualization stops short of these 
extensions for two reasons. First, we hesitate to extend these ideas to larger 
groups because the analysis quickly becomes unwieldy; our framework for 
understanding transactive memory would need to expand geometrically as 
additional individuals were added to the system. Second, we refrain from 
applying this analysis to nonintimate relations for the simple reason that, in such 
dyads, there is not as much to be remembered. Close dyads share a wealth of 
information unique to the dyad, and use it to operate as a unit More distant 
dyads, in turn, engage in transactive processes only infrequently-and in the 
case of a first and only encounter, do so only once. Such pairs will thus not have 
a very rich organizational scheme for information they hold. We find the notion 
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of transactive memory most apt, in sum, for the analysis of cognitive 
interdependence in intimate dyads. 
Our subsequent discussion of transactive memory in this chapter is fashioned 
to coincide with the process-structure distinction. We begin by considering the 
processes involved in the everyday operation of transactive memory. Here, we 
examine the phases of knowledge processing standardly recognized in cognitive 
psychology-encoding, storage, and retrieval-to determine how they occur in 
transactive memory. The second general section examines the nature of the 
organizational structure used for the storage of information in the dyad. The 
structure of stored information across the two individual memories will be 
examined, with a view toward determining how this organization impinges on 
the group's mental operations. The final section concentrates on the role of 
transactive memory, both process and structure, in the life of the dyad. We 
consider how such memory may contribute to compatibility or incompatibility 
in relationships, and how an individual's personal memory may be influenced 
by membership in a transactive system. 
Transactive Memory Processes 
Communication is the transfer of information. When communication takes 
place between people, we might say that information is transferred from one 
memory to another. However, when the dyadic group is conceptualized as 
having one memory system, interpersonal communication in the dyad comes to 
mean the transfer of information within memory. We believe that multiple 
transfers can occur as the dyad encodes information, as it holds information in 
storage, and as it retrieves information-and that such transfers can make each 
of these processes somewhat different from its counterpart occurring at the 
individual level. 
Transactive Encoding 
Obviously, dyads do not have their sense organs in common. The physical and 
social environment thus must be taken in by each person separately. Social 
theorists have repeatedly noted, though, that an individual's perceptions can be 
channeled in social ways. Many have observed, for example, that one partner 
might empathize with another and see the world from the other's "point of 
view." Alternatively, cognitive constructions of a "group perspective" may be 
developed by both partners that lend a certain commonality to their intake of 
information (see Wegner & Giuliano, 1982). These social influences on 
encoding, however, are best understood as effects on the individual. How does 
the dyad encode information? 
When partners encounter some event and encode it privately in their 
individual memories, they may discuss it along the way. And though we might 
commonly think of such a discussion as a "rehash," a mere echo of the original 
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perceived event, there is reason to think that it could be much more. After all, 
whereas experiencing an event can be accomplished quite passively, discussing 
an event requires active processing of the information-and the generation of 
ideas relevant to the event. Several demonstrations of an individual memory 
phenomenon called the "generation effect" indicate that people will often 
remember information they have generated better than information they have 
simply experienced (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). So, for 
instance, one might remember the number 37 better if one had been presented 
with" 14 + 23 = ?" than if one had merely been presented with "37." Partners 
who talk over an event, generating information along the way, might thus come 
to an encoded verbal representation of the event that supplants their original, 
individual encoding. 
The influence of the generation effect could, of course, take many forms. 
Ordinarily, it should lead partners to remember their own contributions to 
dyadic discussions better than the contributions of their partners. This 
phenomenon has been observed in several studies (e.g., Ross & Sicoly, 1979). 
But the generation effect could also contribute to one's memory for group­
generated information. When a couple observes some event-say, a wedding­
they may develop somewhat disparate initial encodings. Each will understand 
that it was indeed a wedding; but only one may encode the fact that the father of 
the bride left the reception in a huff; the other might notice instead the odd, 
cardboard-like flavor of the wedding cake. Their whispered chat during all this 
could lead them to infer that the bride's father was upset by the strange cake. 
Because this interpretation was generated by the group, both partners will have 
thus encoded the group's understanding of the events. Their chat could thus 
revise history for the group, leaving both with stored memories of the father 
angry over a sorry cake. 
Evidence from another domain of cognitive research leads to a similar point 
One of the most powerful determinants of encoding in individual memory is the 
degree to which the incoming information is semantically elaborated (e.g., 
Anderson & Reder, 1979). To elaborate incoming information is simply to draw 
inferences from it and consider its meaning in relation to other information. This 
is precisely what happens in dyadic communications about events. Partners 
often talk about things they have experienced as individuals or as a group. They 
may speak about each other's behavior, about the behavior of others they both 
know, about the day's events, and so on. In such discussions, it is probable that 
those particular events or behaviors relevant to the dyad will be discussed at 
length. They will be tied to other items of knowledge and, in the process, will 
become more elaborately encoded-and thus more likely to be available for 
later retrieval. 
To the extent that generative or elaborative processes are effortful, or require 
careful thinking, their effects could be strengthened yet further. Encoding 
processes that are effortful for the individual typically lead to enhanced memory 
(Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979; Walker, Jones, & Mar, 1983). When 
a couple engages in an argument, cognitive effort may be required for each 
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person to understand what the other is saying and for each to convey a personal 
point of view. Such effort on the part of both could also be necessary when one 
partner is merely trying to teach the other something. It is the shared experience 
of argument, decision-making, or careful analysis that will be remembered more 
readily when the communication is effortful. After all, couples more frequently 
remember their "talks" than their routine dinner conversations. 
These transactive encoding processes could conceivably lead a dyad to 
understand events in highly idiosyncratic and private ways. Their discussions 
could go far afield, linking events to knowledge that, while strongly relevant to 
the dyad, is embedded primarily in the dyad's known history or anticipated 
future. The partners' memories of the encoded events themselves could be 
changed dramatically by the tenor of their discussions, sometimes to the point of 
losing touch with the initial realities the partners perceived. To some degree, 
such departures from originally encoded experience might be corrected by the 
partners' discussions of events with individuals outside the relationship; such 
outsiders would serve to introduce a perspective on events that is uninformed of 
the dyad's concerns, and that therefore might help to modify memory of the 
events. But many experiences are discussed only within the relationship, and 
these are thus destined to be encoded in ways that may make them more 
relevant to the dyad's concerns than to the realities from which they derived. 
Transactive Storage and Modification 
Once information gets into transactive memory, it is stored, perhaps later to be 
retrieved. One important concern regarding storage is the way in which the 
information is organized: Does one person have it, do both have it, or are there 
yet other possible arrangements? We take up these questions later when we 
explore the structure of transactive memory. At this point, we wish to dwell a bit 
on a different aspect of storage-its dynamic properties. One of the most 
intriguing lessons of cognitive research on individual information storage is that 
there is no guarantee that information will be retrieved from storage in the same 
form in which it was originally encoded. Knowledge apparently can be 
modified, even as it resides in memory. 
Studies of individual memory by Loftus and her colleagues (e.g., Loftus, 
Miller, & Bums, 1978) have shown that memory for previously perceived 
events can be influenced by subsequent events. Subjects who saw slides of an 
auto accident, for instance, and who were then asked questions containing 
erroneous implications about perceptual details of the accident, later falsely 
recognized slides depicting the implied details. Research by Hertel ( 1982) 
indicates that such modifications can also occur in an individual's memories for 
his or her cognitive and affective reactions to events. Information obtained well 
after an event can lead one to remember differently one's reaction to the event. 
Errors such as these may occur because information encountered subsequent to 
an event is integrated into one's stored representation of the event. 
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A straightforward extrapolation of these phenomena would suggest that 
similar modifications should occur in a dyad's memory. When the couple 
encodes an initial event and then witnesses subsequent events relevant to it, 
both partners may be subject to parallel individual memory modification, and 
their shared memory representation might thus be modified. We believe, 
though, that memory modification in the dyad could be quite a bit more 
complicated (and interesting) because of iterative effects that occur in the 
course of dyadic communication. Suppose, for instance, that a female partner is 
surprised at a remark made by her neighbor. The neighbor called over the fence 
to say that "Your dog is doing a fine job of fertilizing my lawn." The male 
partner may have originally observed the surprise reaction, but later saw the 
neighbor kick the dog. Still later he might consequently misrecall that the female 
partner had reacted with anger to the neighbor's remark. And quite conceivably, 
she could come to agree with her mate's report of her anger. Through a chain of 
communications, both partners may modify their memory of prior events, 
making this memory consistent with subsequent information that the dyad has 
obtained. 
In a broader sense, the modification of transactive memory may be an 
inevitable part of communication. This is because internally represented 
thoughts may need to be modified by the individual to make them com­
municable. In studies of the social transmission of information, for example, 
Bartlett ( 1932) found that sending a story through a chain of people has certain 
predictable effects on the nature of the sto.ry. It usually becomes a simplified, 
short-hand account that resolves or drops any inconsistencies that were present 
in the original version. A transmitted story thus resembles the protocols people 
give when they recall information after storing it for a long time. Communi­
cating information between people, like storing it within one person over time, 
yields pared-down, "schematic" representations of the information. Of course, 
something like this could occur merely through sloppiness in communication. 
But such social degeneration of information could also be the result of 
modifications that one individual makes in information for the purpose of 
transmitting it to another. The simple fact that communicated information must 
be put into words, for example, requires that it be discrete as opposed to 
continuous (Freyd, 1983 ). The speaker's injunction to make things under­
standable to a listener, in turn, may strip away inconsistencies and irrelevancies 
(cf. Zajonc, 1960). 
These simplification processes, in combination with the aforementioned 
modifiability of the individual's memory, produce a highly modifiable trans­
active memory. One might, for example, tell a partner about a childhood 
incident in which one was frightened by a duck. The experience itself could not 
be transmitted, of course, only the words. Even these would necessarily be brief, 
failing to cover the wealth of detail one originally encoded, and perhaps missing 
much of the context of the episode as well. Later on, one's partner might then 
recount this experience, probably in new words and with different emphases 
(e.g., "There's a duck, dear; run and hide!"). One could fail at this time to point 
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out the difference between this version and one's original experience. One might 
even "play along," elaborating the memory by telling a story of a violent and 
deranged waterfowl. As a consequence of repeated interactions of this kind over 
time, both partners could end up sharing in memory a skeletal and decidedly 
incorrect version of the duck story that one had encoded quite veridically at the 
outset The impact of social transmission that Bartlett observed might not need 
long chains of people passing rumor; it could develop through the repeated 
cycling of information between just two partners. 
Transactive Retrieval 
Retrieval is usually considered the final step of memory processing-the point 
at which the effectiveness of encoding and storage become known. Therefore, 
when a couple is called upon to retrieve information, their success will depend 
in large part on the nature of the transactive processes that have enabled them to 
encode and store the information. But even at this final step, further transactive 
processing may occur. 
As we noted earlier, the couple might search their transactive memory in a 
sequential, interactive process; one partner retrieves an item of information 
relevant to the target item, the other uses this item as a cue for yet another item, 
and so on. Such interactive cueing is often observed when a couple has a shared 
"tip of the tongue" experience. In trying to remember the name of a film, for 
instance, one person might volunteer that "It begins with a B." The other might 
say, "Ooh, ooh, wait, wait," and then later mention that the film was a comedy 
with a Faustian theme. This image might help the first to recall that Dudley 
Moore's costar wore a red satin "devil" suit in part of the movie. Eventually, one 
or the other partner might finally hit on the name. 
It is unclear whether this transactive process would usually result in more 
successful retrieval than would parallel individual retrieval attempts. It is fairly 
obvious, though, that interactive cueing of this kind could often lead to quite 
different retrieved information. Members of a close relationship could easily 
lead each other astray, along lines of inquiry that both recognize as reason­
able-but which are better characterized as flights of fancy than actual 
recollections. At other times, however, they might have the opposite tendency, 
keeping each other "in line" as they pursue the target item. The predominant 
consequences of interactive cueing are presently unknown, for as far as we can 
discern, no research has been conducted to examine this process. 
There is another aspect of dyadic retrieval, however, that has a somewhat 
more proximal empirical base. Cognitive psychologists have investigated the 
effects of the context of individual retrieval attempts, finding that people are 
better able to retrieve information in contexts that resemble the ones in which 
the information was encoded (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). In our view, this 
finding suggests that individuals who have encoded information in the presence 
of an intimate will subsequently retrieve the information more effectively if the 
intimate is present during retrieval. The intimate partner provides an important 
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context for everything one encodes for the duration of the relationship. On 
hearing a tune and humming it with one's partner, on gossiping about friends 
with the partner, and even on watching TV with the partner, there is a special 
context for encoded information. Later retrieval should be facilitated when the 
partner is present. In short, the family that encodes together should retrieve 
together. 
This phenomenon may be responsible for the ease with which past pains in 
relationships are brought to mind in the presence of the other. Similarly, joys 
shared in the past may be retrieved primarily when the other is present. 
Moments shared with other people-whether old flames, parents, or even fellow 
workers-should be relatively more difficult to retrieve in the presence of one's 
current intimate partner. In a way, the co-presence of partners produces in each 
a special mindset, a readiness to remember the information first encountered in 
the same group setting. 
Transactive Memory Structures 
To build a transactive memory is to acquire a set of communication processes 
whereby two minds can work as one. To a certain degree, then, any couple that 
shares a common culture and language has a rudimentary transactive memory. 
The couple possesses a common set of background assumptions (cf. Cicourel, 
197 4; Clark & Haviland, 1977; Grice, 197 5; Lewis, 1969) that they share as 
well with everyone else in their neighborhood. Thus, they begin a relationship, 
even as strangers, with a certain sense that each knows something that the other 
knows. This basic sense, however, can grow in quite different directions as 
changes occur in the organization of the couple's transactive memory. For one, 
as intimates become acquainted, they can each come to understand that there 
are certain areas one knows that the other does not; this change is the 
diflerentiation of transactive structure. And also, as they become acquainted, 
they can develop a sharing of unique knowledge that moves beyond the basic 
sharing that occurs between strangers in a culture; this change is the integration 
of transactive structure. Both differentiation and integration are processes, of 
course, and so might be classed with the various transactive memory processes 
we have discussed thus far. Each can occur during encoding, storage, and 
retrieval phases of transactive knowledge processing. These processes, how­
ever, impinge most clearly on the location of information in transactive 
memory, and so are considered here as we address the topic of transactive 
structure. 
Differentiated Structure 
A person beginning a close relationship will enjoy a background of familiarity 
with certain things-family, friends, special interests and skills-to which the 
partner has never been privy. And while the partner may guess that the person 
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has such realms of knowledge, and even make fairly good estimates of its nature 
and extensity, the partner does not really know for sure what exists in the 
person's individual store of knowledge. So, if the partner was having trouble, 
say, tying a knot, he or she would not be able to say with much confidence 
whether the person would be of any assistance in this enterprise. Knowing that 
the person had been involved in scouting as a child, however, could offer an 
important key. Such a fact about a person is not likely to be immediately 
evident, of course, and so must be acquired at some point for the partner to have 
any success in taking advantage of the person's expertise. 
As each member of the pair becomes more cognizant of the specialties of the 
other, the dyad's memory as a whole grows in differentiation. To describe this 
feature of transactive memory more explicitly, it is useful to introduce 
distinctions regarding three kinds of information a person may hold in personal 
memory: higher-order information, lower-order information, and location 
information. One can think of higher-order information as the topic, theme, or 
gist of some set of items of lower-order information. So, for example, the term 
"fruit" can be considered higher-order information with respect to terms such as 
"apple," "orange," and "banana." By the same token, "what George said" can 
be regarded as higher-order information than the actual words he spoke. 
Distinctions like this one have been made frequently in cognitive psychology, 
sometimes using terms such as "schema" to refer to higher-order information. 
We include the distinction here to indicate simply that there are degrees of the 
specificity of knowledge represented in memory. Location information, in tum, 
is information as to where any piece of higher-order or lower-order information 
may be found. In a sense, it is an "address." When one knows that information 
on Kant's Critique of pure reason can be found in a library, in a philosopher 
friend's memory, or even in one's own memory, one has location information 
about Kant's Critique. 
Communication in the dyad may lead to the transmission of any of the three 
types of information. Certainly, one might tell a partner of the existence of some 
higher-order knowledge (e.g., "Sam and Wanda were at the party") or some 
lower-order knowledge (e.g., "He said he was ashamed of her when she got 
drunk"). One would also convey location knowledge in saying these things, for 
one would immediately give away that these facts were available in one's own 
memory. It is possible, however, that one could convey location information 
with regard to higher-order knowledge without conveying the lower-order 
knowledge associated with it. Simply noting that "I heard what Sam and Wanda 
were talking about at the party," for example, would communicate to one's 
partner that one held both higher and lower orders of information in one's 
memory-but it would not reveal the nature of the lower-order information. In 
making such communications, one would contribute to the differentiation of the 
transactive memory structure. 
A differentiated transactive structure, in this light, is one that contains mutual 
higher-order and location information, but reserves lower-order information for 
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one or the other partner's memory alone. Knowledge of general topics is shared 
by both persons, and with the simultaneous sharing of location information, 
each person obtains a personal "directory" for knowledge held by the dyad. The 
individual in this system may have any amount of lower-order information. At 
the extreme, one person might hold all the lower-order information available to 
the dyad. This person could find anything that the dyad knows merely by 
accessing his or her own memory. The other partner, in tum, would have similar 
access-but would be required to access the other's memory, through 
communication, to obtain any item of lower-order information. More com­
monly, of course, couples develop differentiated structures in which each 
partner holds some proportion of the lower-order information accessible to the 
dyad. 
The development of differentiated transactive memory is an important effect 
of the reciprocal self-disclosure that usually accompanies relationship forma­
tion. Couples typically begin a relationship by revealing information about 
themselves to each other, starting with fairly mundane surface information, they 
move on to exchange more private knowledge of themselves (cf. Altman & 
Taylor, 1973; Archer, 1980). And, when they are trading knowledge of their 
life goals, personality traits, emotional investments, or other personal qualities, 
they are also building the differentiation of their transactive memory. Each fact 
about the self that is revealed to the other lends the other a sense of one's 
expertise and experience. Thus, self-disclosure regularly transmits higher-order 
information. Sometimes, much lower-order information is conveyed as well­
such as when one tells the other not only that one "likes Greek food," but also 
details one's recipes for several Greek dishes. More commonly, though, these 
lower-order details will not be communicated. The other will have sufficient 
access to them merely by knowing the higher-order information and the location 
information that is communicated "piggyback" with it. In the future, when the 
pair wants Greek food, the expert in this domain will be expected by both 
parties to supply the needed lower-order information. 
The differentiated organization of knowledge in the dyad makes for an 
efficient transactive memory. For all those domains of knowledge that the group 
might need to know-but that neither individual must know alone-differen­
tiated organization eases the work of one or the other partner. Lower-order 
information can be communicated on a "need to know" basis, as when the 
Greek gourmet can direct the cooking of a mutually prepared meal, noting 
ingredients and steps to the other as they are necessary. And the partner who 
does not know the details of knowledge in a particular domain can nevertheless 
be confident that the dyad will be effective. To a degree, couples may even 
undertake to manage their affairs such that transactive memory will be 
differentiated. They may decide, for instance, that one should have responsibil­
ity for the group's checkbook balancing, that the other should have the 
responsibility for knowing about a child's progress at school, and so on. In this 
way, they avoid wasting transactive memory space on duplication of lower-
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order information. Indeed, such efficiency may often be produced in a 
relationship by virtue of partners' prior adoption of the specialized knowledge 
responsibilities that accompany sex roles, occupational roles, and the like. 
Differentiated structure may be efficient, but it also may lead to certain 
problems in information management in the relationship. For instance, as 
higher-order information and location information are shared, and the trans­
active memory thus becomes differentiated and increasingly capable of 
accessing unshared domains of lower-order information, we would expect an 
increase in the pair's confidence in their knowledge in general. Organization of 
information regularly leads individuals toward greater confidence that they 
know the information (see, e.g., Pratt, Luszcz, Mackenzie-Keating, & Manning, 
1982). With differentiation, each person would become increasingly likely to 
believe that the group would be able to retrieve most any information-though 
the person might not have any access to the information in personal memory. 
The female who has specialized in knowledge linked most strongly with her 
stereotypic sex role, for instance, may enter a relationship with a male and 
experience an immediate surge in confidence that her dyad will be able to fix a 
leaky faucet, play poker, or otherwise employ knowledge domains usually 
associated with the male sex role. Such presumptions may often be unfounded. 
Differentiated structure could also lead on occasion to confusions regarding 
one's own knowledge. The "feeling of knowing" (Hart, 1967) might very well 
arise not only for domains that one indeed knows, but also for domains of 
information known only by virtue of transactive memory. If one partner keeps 
track of phone numbers, for example, the other may never have experienced any 
difficulty in retrieving a needed number. All the other must do is ask. On 
encountering a setting in which the partner is not present, however, the other 
could fail to appreciate the absence of the usual information source-and so 
continue to assume that the phone numbers are immediately available. Such 
confusions should be particularly intrusive in the very settings that usually allow 
for· transactions between partners. At home, in familiar recreational contexts, 
and the like, it seldom happens that one is stranded without the other. Thus, 
much lower-order information may be taken for granted. Only when one must 
be alone will these assumptions be examined, and the extent of one's personal 
hold on information be discovered. 
It is perhaps fortunate that transactive memory is never entirely differenti­
ated. A conversation between partners who share little or no lower-order 
information, for instance, could be tiresome indeed. They would chat about 
generalities, but because they held no lower-order information in common, they 
could never get into the details of their individual domains of knowledge. They 
could reiterate their personal qualities and interests, delving again into the 
process of reciprocal self-disclosure. But eventually, they would have little new 
to say to each other-every higher-order item of knowledge would already be 
shared, and conversations would deteriorate rapidly (e.g., one says "I know 
every batting average in the American League"; the other says "I know you do, 
dear"). Given the human tendency to converse primarily about the new (Grice, 
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The development of integrated transactive structures has been investigated in 
various guises in social psychology. Studies of group decision making (e.g., 
Davis, 1980; Kerr, 1981) and "social combination" processes (e.g., Laughlin, 
1980) have examined the means by which groups reach integrated under­
standings of topics on the basis of initially disparate individual understandings. 
As a rule, these lines of research have indicated that groups strive toward a 
unity of conceptualization, a general view held by all members. This is certainly 
consistent with our notion of integrated transactive structure. With the present 
analytical framework, however, it is possible to go one step further in 
understanding such processes. 
We believe that the press toward integrated structure in transactive memory 
is responsible for the unique, emergent properties of group mental life. What the 
group-mind theorists were searching for can be found in the seemingly 
"magical" transformations that occur when disparate sets of information are 
combined into new ideas. One partner may bring one set of knowledge, the other 
may bring something different, and they then may experience some conflict. But 
in the healthy dyadic relationship, this conflict does not necessarily lead to the 
dissolution of the group. Rather, it energizes the integration process, leading the 
couple to seek some new conceptualization that will transform their conflict into 
agreement. The new formulation that is reached, however, does not just 
promote compromise between partners. It also makes the group think about 
something in a way that the individuals would not; the group's viewpoint 
becomes unique. 
This press toward unique integrations in close dyads was the topic of research 
by Giuliano and Wegner (1983). Their experiment was planned to induce a 
cohesive group state in some heterosexual pairs but not in others, and to 
compare the interactions of such "close" and "distant" couples during dyadic 
problem-solving. The problems posed to these couples were designed to 
resemble a typical hurdle that dyads must overcome repeatedly in daily life: The 
couple encounters an opportunity to retrieve a single target item from 
transactive memory-when each member has already retrieved a candidate 
item from personal memory. This could happen, say, when a couple must 
decide on a restaurant to visit when each partner has already thought of a 
possibility. The hypothesis was that "distant" couples, when faced with 
disagreement, would opt for the personal choice of one or the other partner; 
"close" couples, in contrast, were expected to use such conflict as a stimulus to 
invent a new, group-generated possibility. Quite simply, unique integrations 
would evolve in the face of conflict-but only when the couple had been induced 
to feel "close." 
For each experimental session, two or three male/female pairs were 
randomly formed from a group of people who did not know one another. Pairs 
were taken to a room, seated at adjacent chairs facing opposite directions, and 
given several yards of yam neatly wrapped around a stick. Partners were 
instructed to wrap the yarn around the two of them, exchange places, and wrap 
the yam back onto the stick-all of this in privacy, but without talking. This 
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exercise was designed to induce cohesiveness between partners. Out of concern 
that initial negative impressions might hinder the effectiveness of the cohesive­
ness manipulation, the researchers had subjects anonymously rate their initial 
impressions of other group members immediately after everyone arrived for the 
session. Strong negative first impressions (prior to pairing) on the part of at least 
one partner led to the exclusion of three pairs from the analyses. This left a total 
of 16 couples to become wrapped up with each other. 
The problems to be solved were patterned after TV's "Family Feud" game 
show. The problems consisted of 20 categories (e.g., a place to get pizza; 
bedtime for college students) and subjects were instructed to predict the 
response most commonly given by 100 undergraduates who had been polled for 
their opinions. In order to compare individual and group memory structures, 
subjects completed this questionnaire twice. They filled out the questionnaire 
for the first time individually, just prior to being paired for the cohesiveness 
manipulation. The questionnaire was filled out by pairs the second time. Half of 
the subjects filled out the questionnaire with their original (yarn) partners. For 
the other half, opposite-sex pairs were formed such that the problems were 
solved by partners who had not experienced the cohesiveness manipulation 
together. The couples were tape-recorded as they discussed the categories and 
tried to develop a single answer that was ostensibly to be scored for popularity 
against the responses of the polled undergraduates. 
The typical procedure that the couples followed in selecting their final 
response started with each partner revealing his or her earlier response. Then, 
they could adopt one of several strategies for determining a dyadic response. 
When partners initially had a similar individual response (about 24% of the 
time), the dyadic response could be the same as their individual responses or it 
could be different. Not surprisingly, couples whose individual responses 
coincided chose that response for the dyad on 99% of their agreements. A much 
wider range of options was available when individual responses differed. In 
many cases, partners in this situation would simply decide on the individual 
response of one or the other. For questions calling for a qualitative response 
(e.g., naming a musical group), this often happened-producing a lop-sided 
compromise between partners. For questions of a quantitative nature (e.g., the 
average age that females marry for the first time), responses were often derived 
from the two individual responses as a true compromise between them. When 
the ages of 18 and 22 were given, for instance, 20 would be the dyad's 
response. 
The final possible strategy when individual responses differed was to develop 
a dyadic response that resembled neither individual response. Such strategies 
were, of course, of special interest in this research. Rather than signifying some 
sort of compromise between individual responses, they represent unique 
integrations-choices that are unpredictable from individual responses. This 
happened for questions requiring either quantitative or qualitative responses. In 
the case of a qualitative item such as "Name a good candy bar," for instance, 
individual responses of Mars and Milky Way might yield a group response of 
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Snickers. In the case of a quantitative item such as "Average bedtime for 
college students," individual responses of 12:00 AM and 1 :00 AM might produce 
a group response of I :30 AM. 
In the parlance of transactive memory, the couples in this study were placed 
in the position of having a differentiated transactive structure. Each time they 
discussed their initial personal responses, and so communicated lower-order 
information, they took the chance of discovering differentiation-different items 
of information coming from the different personal repositories of transactive 
memory. Their strategies for resolving these discrepancies could then be of two 
types: compromise strategies, which were derived from individual structures, or 
integrative strategies, which were independent of them. The first type includes 
group responses that originated with one or the other partner, as well as 
responses derived as midpoints between the two individual responses. Strategies 
independent of individual responses are integrative in nature and uniquely 
represent the dyad. 
The results revealed that integrative responses were the strategy of choice 
when "close" couples had to resolve differences. The correlations between the 
overall number of initial differences of "close" partners and their use of 
integrative strategies revealed a significant relationship for both qualitative 
questions [r(16) = .43, p < .05) and quantitative questions [r( l6) = .54, 
p < .021. For "distant" partners, the corresponding correlations revealed no 
significant relationships [ r(  16) = .18, qualitative; r( 16) = .00, quantitative I. 
For "close" couples, therefore, initial discrepancies resulted in increased 
attempts to unite the pair with unique, group-generated solutions. The use of 
these unique integrations was not promoted by the degree of initial discrepancy 
for previously unpaired subjects. These results support the idea of a transactive 
communication process in a close dyad that prompts integrative communication 
whenever discrepancies in lower-order information are revealed. 
The tape-recordings of the problem-solving sessions showed that couples 
sometimes verbally prearranged their strategy. Several couples clearly set out a 
"turn-taking" strategy for resolving discrepancies-"We'll do yours this time 
and mine next." It is interesting that commentators on group conflict resolution 
have often argued that such tum-taking is a primary cooperative response to 
incompatible individual preferences (e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). The 
present results suggest that this is not the strategy of choice in close dyads. 
Close couples faced with differentiated knowledge structures often do not 
verbalize their integrative strategy, but it seems to be pursued with a certain 
automaticity and urgency. Asked to "Name a magazine," for example, a couple 
produced individual responses of People and Newsweek-and instead of 
discussing these at all, immediately turned to suggesting other possibilities. In 
some couples, the unique integration was then a good answer (e.g., Time); in 
others, the final choice was less appropriate (e.g., Playboy). But in all cases of 
integration, even though the integrative strategy was not verbally formulated by 
the dyad, it was rapidly adopted, cutting short the discussion of individual 
preferences. 
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As a final note on this research, it  should be pointed out that the findings 
signal only a first step in the investigation of transactive processes. Clearly, the 
results pertain primarily to ad hoc couples who have been made to feel close, 
not partners in ongoing close relationships. Moreover, the findings arose in a 
context quite unlike experiments on integrative processes in memory. Because 
the emphasis of this research was on transactive processes, and not on the 
accuracy of group retrieval of presented information, it was not necessary to 
develop these findings in the context of a standard memory paradigm. Until 
further inquiry is made into the production of unique, integrative knowledge in 
close relationships, the generality of the observed phenomenon-and its impact 
on the accuracy of transactive memory-can be anticipated only in broad 
outline. 
Transactive Memory and Intimate Life 
We have hinted at an important idea in various ways throughout the chapter, 
and it is time now to make the proposition explicit: A transactive memory is a 
fundamental component of all close relationships. We believe that the potential 
for transactive memory makes intimacy among humans possible, allowing them 
to develop a form of interdependence with each other that is both lasting and 
continually in flux. The immediate implications of this idea are twofold: First, a 
dysfunctional or incompletely operative transactive memory in a relationship 
should portend the breakdown of closeness; second, many of the personal 
difficulties that accompany the dissolution of an intimate dyad should be 
traceable to the absence of transactive memory. Here, we explore each of these 
implications in tum. 
Pathologies of Transactive Memory 
Perhaps the most obvious failure of transactive memory would occur if it never 
got started. Intimacy could not develop in a relationship if the couple never 
talked, if their initial personal knowledge stores were so disjunct that they had 
no common ground to discuss, or if they could find no way to put together their 
ideas into new, group-generated thoughts. In terms of our theoretical analysis, 
then, intimacy could fail because of a lack of transactive processes, a lack of 
higher-order linkages that would allow differentiation, or a lack of common 
lower-order knowledge stores that would allow integration. 
Once a relationship has formed, the processes of communication, differentia­
tion, and integration must continue. We suspect that communication will halt in 
an ongoing partnership, bringing that partnership to an end, when a gross 
imbalance occurs between the processes of differentiation and integration. As 
we have already pointed out, extreme differentiation can bring an end to a 
relationship because it fails to promote the sharing of lower-order information 
and the consequent development of unique, group-generated knowledge. But 
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just as intimates with too much differentiation can be troubled by too little 
interdependence, intimates with too much integration can become the victims of 
too much interdependence. 
The danger of integration in transactive memory is its capacity to produce 
duplication. At the outset of the integration process, partners discuss differ­
entially known details about a common topic. In sharing these details, they 
develop a similar understanding based on modified details from both persons. 
This similar understanding will lead each partner to remember only some of the 
details that originated in his or her own memory, and will also convert the 
higher-order knowledge of the topic held by each partner into a single, shared 
form. A couple that only conducts integrative discussions will, over time, make 
many of the higher-order and lower-order integrations that are available across 
their fields of differentiated knowledge. Such wholesale integration could lead to 
the very same state of boredom with the relationship that is reached through 
extreme differentiation; there is nothing new to talk about. Furthermore, if each 
partner has the same knowledge that the other has, they each independently 
have access to the group memory. Neither partner requires access to the other 
for any information, and they thus can become functionally isolated from each 
other despite their apparent closeness. Contrary to its intended effect, then, 
integration can render transactive memory redundant and unnecessary to the 
individual. 
Duplication can precipitate relationship problems in yet another way. Once 
considerable duplication has occurred-say, in a couple living together for 
several years-it can be assumed by partners that their own knowledge is 
sufficient for group-relevant judgments. In essence, each assumes that the 
duplication with the other is complete. A partner might know, for example, that 
the group typically goes out to dinner on Saturday nights, and even knows what 
the other will prefer to order. Thus, the partner will have no qualms about 
making dinner reservations for Saturday, unbeknownst to the other, and might 
even go on to order the entire meal for two while the other is still looking at the 
menu. This strategy will succeed if the duplication is indeed total-down to the 
partner's knowledge of which of the six available soups the other will prefer. 
The strategy will fail, however, whenever duplication is incomplete for any 
reason. The other may have been exposed to information suggesting that a new 
soup would be best, or perhaps has just decided that the usual is becoming 
tiresome. The partner who assumes duplication will often fail to pick up on such 
subtleties, and in the end, will be rightfully accused of" taking for granted" the 
other. 
In essence, duplication and the assumption of duplication threaten a 
relationship when partners believe that they know each other very well. This 
potential endpoint of integrative processes reminds us, then, that couples can 
become too familiar. It is only when couples do not share everything they 
know-or at least believe that not everything is shared-that their relationship 
will be open for further discussion and development. To a degree, this ironic 
twist in relationship development seems to pose quite a problem. How can 
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couples who remain together for many years keep from becoming duplicates? 
Perhaps the only way to maintain such "freshness" in the relationship is for 
each partner continually to seek out domains of knowledge unknown to the 
other. A renewal of the differentiation of their transactive memory could occur 
every day-if the partners are willing to be apart, to experience life on their 
own, and to contribute to the dyad by being at least somewhat independent 
of it. 
Parting With Transactive Memory 
A couple may break up because of transactive memory, or their relationship 
may end in spite of it. What happens to each partner then? Amidst the 
emotional turmoil that can accompany partnership dissolution (Berscheid, 
1983 ), there may also appear several cognitive effects that can throw the 
individual into a confused and inefficient state for some time. Certainly, the 
privilege of discussing events, of coming to a negotiated view of them, and of 
reacting to them on the basis of this group perspective will be ended. A common 
feeling accompanying relationship dissolution, then, will be one of indecision. A 
Ione partner who has become used to transactive processes may almost 
automatically defer judgment on issues as they arise, holding off until an 
interpretation of events can be transacted. The person will have difficulty 
forming an independent and personal memory system. 
With the loss of the relationship, one also loses access to the differentiated 
portion of transactive memory held by the other. This loss will be recognized 
only slowly. As one fails to find phone numbers, recipes, household objects, or 
the like, it begins to become evident. But more profound losses will be noted as 
time goes by. One's memory of favorite episodes will fade, almost inexplicably, 
because the other is not present to supply the differentiated details that one 
never stored for oneself. One will also lose the benefits of the other's special 
skills, never again savoring that chocolate mousse or being able to look on a flat 
tire as a mere inconvenience. Indeed, because transactive retrieval is no longer 
possible, there will be entire realms of one's experience that merely slip away, 
unrecognized in their departure, and never to be retrieved again. 
Because the other has served often as a context for one's personal encoding of 
events, there will also be a personal deficit in retrieval. Everything one has 
learned in the presence of the other, even without depending on the other for 
transactive encoding or retrieval, will become a bit more difficult to retrieve 
from one's personal memory. The other has regularly served as a backdrop for 
one's experience, a part of the setting in which the experience was encoded. 
And even though the other may have played only a bystander's role in the event, 
one's encoding of the event is specific to the other's presence and may not allow 
for retrieval without the other (cf. Tulving & Thomson, 1973). A new partner 
who shares some qualities with one's former intimate might serve as a substitute 
context, and so aid one in gaining access to one's own stored information. 
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Should one become angry at the former partner, yet other changes in personal 
memory could result. One might renounce certain of the integrations that the 
group had previously achieved because they continue to be too reminiscent of 
the relationship. Just as the former dyad's penchant for Sunday afternoon 
crossword puzzles would be abandoned by the partner, their commonly held 
views of friends, activities, or experiences would be discarded as well. 
Similarly, one might attempt to stop speaking of past events in the "group" 
code-mentioning things that "we" did-and so disguise for oneself and others 
the degree of one's previous interdependence (cf. Wegner, 1981 ). The resentful 
partner could even attempt to develop new domains of expertise (e.g., "No one 
will ever tell me again that I can't fix a flat!") or let old ones fall into disuse. In 
this way, it is guaranteed that the original transactive memory developed by the 
group will no longer fit. Should a reconciliation be attempted, a newly 
negotiated transactive memory structure would be required-making for extra 
accommodative work on the part of the less-changed partner and perhaps a 
"shake-up" of the entire system. 
Admittedly, some of these effects could accrue merely by losing contact with 
a brief acquaintance. The ending of a long-term relationship, however, will 
surely exact these tolls in every area of one's personal information-processing 
system. One will have difficulty interpreting events without discussion, and so 
blindly seek the advice of strangers. One will fail to encode previously 
differentiated information for oneself, and thus err in coping with all the now­
personal information domains. One will abandon the dyad's integrative views of 
life events, perhaps to adopt less certain or satisfying views that have only the 
fact that they are one's own to recommend them. And, one will simply lose 
contact with vast memory domains that one had hoped were personal-but that 
in reality were transactive, and so ended with the relationship. 
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Norbert L. Kerr, John M. Levine, 
Richard Machalek, David J. Schneider, William B. Swann, Jr., Robin R 
Vallacher, Robert A. Wicklund, and the editor of this volume for their helpful 
comments. 
References 
Allport, G. W. ( 1968). The historical background of modem social psychology. In G. 
Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology, (2nd ed.) (Vol. I, pp. 
1-80). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Altman, I., & Taylor, D. A. (1 973). Social penetration: The development of 
interpersonal relationships. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
Anderson, J., & Reder, L. ( 1979). Elaborative processing explanation of depth of 
processing. In L. S. Cermak & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Levels of processing in human 
memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Archer, R. L. ( 1980). Self-disclosure. In D. M. Wegner & R. R. Vallacher (Eds.), The 
self in social psychology (pp. 183-205). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bartlett, F. C. ( 1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cognitive Interdependence in Close Relationships 275 
Berscheid, E. ( 1983). Emotion. In H. H. Kelley et al. (Eds.), Close relationships (pp. 
1 10-168). New York: Freeman. 
BertalanfTy, L. von ( 1968). General system theory. New York: Braziller. 
Cicourel, A. V. ( 1974). Cognitive sociology. New York: Free Press. 
Clark, H. H., & Haviland, S. E. ( 1977). Comprehension and the given-new contract. In 
R. 0. Freedle (Ed.), Discourse processes: Advances in research and theory (Vol. I). 
Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Davis, J. H. ( 1980). Group decision and procedural justice. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), 
Progress in social psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Davis, M. S. ( 197 3). Intimate relations. New York: Free Press. 
Durkheim, E. (1915). Elementary forms of the religious life. New York: Macmillan. 
Freyd, J. J. ( 1983). Shareability: The social psychology of epistemology. Cognitive 
Science, 7, 191-210. 
Giuliano, T., & Wegner, D. M. ( 1983). Group formation and the integration of 
transactive memory. Unpublished manuscript, University of Texas at Austin. 
Grice, H. P. ( 1975). Logic in conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax 
and semantics (Vol. 3). New York: Academic Press. 
Hart, J. T. ( 1967). Memory and the memory monitoring process. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 685-691. 
Hayes-Roth, 8., & Thorndyke, P. W. ( 1979). Integration of knowledge from text. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 91-108. 
Hegel, G. W. F. ( 1910). The phenomenology of mind (Trans.). London: Allen and 
Unwin. (Original work published 1807) 
Hertel, P. T. ( 1982). Remembering reactions and facts: The influence of subsequent 
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni­
tion, 8, 513-529. 
Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. ( 1981 ). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 
67-85. 
Jung, C. G. ( 1922). Collected papers on analytical psychology (2nd ed.). London: 
Bailliere, Tindall, and Cox. 
Kelley, H. H., Berscheid, E., Christensen, A., Harvey, J. H., Huston, T. L., Levinger, 
G., McClintock, E., Peplau, L. A., & Peterson, D. R ( 1983). Close relationships. 
New York: Freeman. 
Kelley, H. H., & Thibaut, J. W. ( 1978). Interpersonal relationships: A theory of 
interdependence. New York: Wiley-lnterscience. 
Kerr, N. L. ( 1981 ). Social transition schemes: Charting the group's road to agreement. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 684-702. 
Knowles, E. S. ( 1982). From individuals to group members: A dialectic for the social 
sciences. In W. J. Ickes & E. S. Knowles (Eds.), Personality, roles, and social 
behavior (pp. 1-32). New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Laughlin, P. R ( 1980). Social combination processes of cooperative problem-solving 
groups on verbal intellective tasks. In M. Fishbein (Ed.), Progress in social 
psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
LeBon, G. (1903). The crowd. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Bums, H. J. ( I  978). Semantic integration of verbal 
information into a visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Learning and Memory, 4, 19-31. 
Maciver, R M. ( 1921 ). Community. New York: Macmillan. 
McDougall, W. ( 1920). The group mind. New York: Putnam. 
Pareto, V. ( 1935). The mind and society. New York: Harcourt-Brace. 
Pratt, M. W., Luszcz, M. A., MacKenzie-Keating, S., & Manning, A. ( 1982). Thinking 
about stories: The story schema in meta cognition. Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior, 21, 493-505. 
276 Daniel M. Wegner, Toni Giuliano, and Paula T. Hertel 
Ross, E. A. ( 1908). Social psychology. New York: Macmillan. 
Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. ( 1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 322-336. 
Rousseau, J. J. ( 1767). A treatise on the social contract. London: Becket and 
DeHondt. 
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. ( 1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a 
phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
4, 592-604. 
Spencer, H. ( 1876). The principles of sociology. New York: Appleton. 
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. ( 1 973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in 
episodic memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-373. 
Tyler, S. W., Hertel, P. T., McCallum, M. C., & Ellis, H. C. ( 1 979). Cognitive effort 
and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 
5, 607-617. 
Walker, N., Jones, J. P., & Mar, H. H. ( 1983). Encoding processes and recall of text. 
Memory & Cognition, 11, 275-282. 
Wegner, D. M. ( 1 98 1 ,  August). When does the intimate group come to mind? Paper 
presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles. 
Wegner, D. M., & Giuliano, T. ( 1982). The forms of social awareness. In W. J. Ickes & 
E. S. Knowles (Eds.), Personality, roles, and social behavior (pp. 165-198). New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 
Wundt, W. ( 1 9 1 6  ). Elements of folk psychology (Trans.). New York: Macmillan. 
(Original work published 1910) 
Zajonc, R. B. ( 1960). The process of cognitive tuning in communication. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 159-167. 
